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REFLECTIONS ON BREEN & STRANG’S 
A LIGHT UNSEEN: A HISTORY OF 
CATHOLIC LEGAL EDUCATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
ANGELA C. CARMELLA† 
In A Light Unseen: A History of Catholic Legal Education in 
the United States, Professor John Breen and Professor Lee 
Strang have undertaken a monumental task and have produced 
an impressive book, particularly with respect to the fascinating 
history of the development of Catholic legal education.  They 
provide a thoughtful consideration of how Catholic law schools 
can be more distinctively Catholic and make a strong case for the 
critical need for more explicit curricular and scholarly integration 
of the Catholic intellectual tradition.  In this Essay, I make 
suggestions in three areas: (1) on the record regarding failed 
efforts to develop a distinctly Catholic approach to legal 
education; (2) on the inculturation of the Catholic intellectual 
tradition within the law school; and (3) on the virtues shaping 
the Catholic law school professional ethics curriculum. 
Before setting out my suggestions, I would ask the authors to 
consider broadening their claim that “[t]he Catholic faith, like all 
religions, is a set of ideas.”1  I have always thought Catholicism 
is first and foremost an encounter with a person: Jesus the 
Christ, “the Sacrament of encounter with God.”2  We meet Him 
in the Eucharist and in the Word, in the poor, and in our 
 
† Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I am grateful to 
Reverend Nicholas S. Gengaro, Paul Hauge, and Catherine McCauliff for comments 
on earlier drafts. The views expressed here are solely my own. 
1 John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, A Light Unseen: A History of Catholic Legal 
Education in the United States 7 (Jan. 20, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the St. John’s Law Review).  
2 Robert P. Imbelli, Stewards of the Tradition: Christ the Center, BOS. C. C21 
RESOURCES, Spring 2007, at 7–8, https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/top/church21/ 
pdf/Spring_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P36-GQU3]. I refer to the distinction between 
fides quae, the faith that is believed, and fides qua, the faith by which one believes. 
The former is a set of ideas, and the latter refers to trust, the action of believing in 
Christ. Further, imitatio Christi, at the heart of Christian spirituality from its 
earliest days, goes well beyond a set of ideas. 
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neighbor.  This truth of encounter ensures that the “intellectual” 
tradition is broad enough to include the contemplatives and 
mystics and others who better understood “that the living Christ 
is the heart of the Catholic wisdom tradition”3 and that “love is 
the highest form of knowing.”4  Catholicism and its intellectual 
tradition may have generated grand and powerful ideas, but 
those ideas animate and shape people and institutions only 
through lived realities that are grounded in love, mercy, and 
solidarity.  Perhaps a recognition of encounter with Jesus would 
help explain why, as the authors beautifully state,  
wherever the Catholic tradition held sway, its ideas—about God 
and man and the universe, and the relationship between 
them—have informed existing social structures and institutions 
and given birth to new ones—everything from politics and 
economics to the arts and the family, even the very notion of the 
individual as a being who possesses inherent dignity and 
worth.5 
I. DISTINCTIVENESS IN CATHOLIC LEGAL EDUCATION 
The book laments the failure of Catholic legal education to be 
different from secular legal education.  In reaching this conclusion, 
however, the authors have not given sufficient credit to the role 
of Catholic law schools in encouraging scholarly exploration of 
the relationship of law to the Catholic intellectual tradition.  I 
understand that Chapter Four, not yet available, will describe 
this movement.  I hope that it will be described in its fullness and 
diversity, and not primarily as a “revival of orthodoxy” among 
scholars, as the draft appears to contemplate.6 
In fact, over the last twenty-five or so years, many professors at 
Catholic law schools (and Catholic law professors at non-Catholic 
schools) have been building a body of scholarship on Catholic 
perspectives on various fields of law and jurisprudential schools 
of thought.  Professor Breen and Professor Strang, together 
 
3 Id. at 8. 
4 BERNARD MCGINN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MYSTICISM: ORIGINS TO THE FIFTH 
CENTURY 235 (1994). 
5 Breen & Strang, supra note 1, at 8. 
6 Id. at 460 (noting that after 1990 we saw “heightened awareness of [the] need 
for distinctively Catholic culture-preserving institutions,” and as “part of [a] broader 
Catholic revival” there was a “revival of orthodoxy witnessed in other parts of [the] 
Church occurring among [the] new generation of Catholic legal scholars,” and 
further noting that “Roe prompted re-evaluation of [the] basis of law and [the] need 
for institutions that articulated that basis.”).  
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with the participants at this conference, have been major 
contributors to this movement.  Christian Perspectives on Legal 
Thought, which I coedited with Protestant scholars Michael 
McConnell and Robert Cochran, was viewed as “new” and 
“pathbreaking” when it was published in 2001.7  Yet even before 
its publication, and increasingly since, scholars have convened 
conferences and published books and articles attempting to 
understand and critique law from religious perspectives.  
Unsurprisingly, Catholics dominate this area—because they have 
at their disposal intellectual tools from natural law, Roman law, 
Catholic social thought, and the Catholic intellectual tradition. 
Catholics also dominate because many Catholic universities 
and their law schools have prioritized exploration in this area.8  
Journals and centers create institutional openness and outlets.9  
A Light Unseen should highlight these efforts prominently, 
perhaps even pulling together scholarly works and institutional 
resources in an appendix as a service to readers.  Indeed, the 
authors’ main proposal—that law professors should draw on the 
Catholic intellectual tradition—is now possible precisely because 
we already have numerous examples of such efforts.  A candid 
recognition of these efforts and their contribution to the 
development of at least some degree of distinctiveness within 
Catholic legal education should serve to temper the conclusion 
that “[t]here is next to nothing about their faculty and faculty  
 
 
7 CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 255 (Michael W. McConnell et 
al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES]. My contribution to that 
volume was A Catholic View of Law and Justice. 
8 My home institution, Seton Hall Law School, has consistently encouraged me 
and my colleagues Kathleen Boozang (Catholic health care ethics), Michael 
Ambrosio (natural law), Catherine McCauliff (Catholic Intellectual Tradition, 
Medieval Thought), Paula Franzese (Catholic Social Thought), John Coverdale 
(History of Opus Dei), David Opderbeck (Evangelical Protestant thought), Edward 
Hartnett (Catholic Social Thought), and Bernard Freamon (Islam) to engage in 
religion and law teaching, or scholarship, or both; we have hosted the annual 
Religious Legal Theory conference and sponsored a law and theology speaker series. 
9 Some examples: Seton Hall Law School sponsored many programs through its 
Center for Religiously Affiliated Non-Profit Corporations; journals like Journal of 
Catholic Legal Studies (St. John’s), Journal of Catholic Social Thought (Villanova), 
and Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy (Notre Dame), as well as secular 
journals like the Journal of Law and Religion and many law reviews, Catholic and 
non-Catholic, are open to publishing work discussing religious perspectives. Other 
institutions offer programming, like Fordham’s Institute on Religion, Law and 
Lawyer’s Work and Georgetown’s Initiative on Catholic Social Thought and Public 
Life (at the university but obviously important to the law school). 
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scholarship, their curricula and pedagogy, . . . that set them 
apart from the mine-run of American law schools.  Catholic law 
schools are fundamentally the same.”10   
Protestant Christians have also been exploring the 
relationship between religion and law, between love and justice.11  
As the Archbishop of Canterbury William Temple said, “It is 
axiomatic that love should be the predominant Christian impulse 
and that justice is the primary form of love in social 
organization.”12  Catholic law schools should encourage dialogue 
with this scholarship, especially with regard to the conceptual 
and linguistic differences between love and justice, on the one 
hand, and the common good on the other. 
II. ON THE CATHOLIC INTELLECTUAL TRADITION 
IN THE LAW SCHOOL SETTING 
A. Practical Obstacles to Catholic Legal Education: Defining 
and Enforcing the Catholic Intellectual Tradition 
The Catholic intellectual tradition, with special emphasis on 
the social teachings, is the proper frame for the intellectual 
architecture of a Catholic law school.  The tradition is vast and 
developing, ancient and modern.  It is possible to engage the world 
of ideas and converse with it.  And yes, the Catholic anthropology 
is central.  
The tradition is broad, pulling in thousands of years of 
classical, biblical, theological, and philosophical reflection.  I see 
that breadth as a strength, not as a weakness.  My concern is that 
some who are attracted to the book’s proposal might view the 
tradition’s breadth as a real danger and feel the need to cabin it.  
That, in my view, would be the greater danger.  
Retaining the breadth of the Catholic intellectual tradition is 
critical to the success of any curriculum change or program of 
faculty scholarship.  Moreover, the law school project must expect 
scholarly disagreement.  Any two authors might bring religious 
reflection to a legal topic and employ distinct analyses and reach 
different conclusions.  One might find that the “law and economics” 
 
10 Breen & Strang, supra note 1, at 464. 
11 See generally AGAPE, JUSTICE, AND LAW: HOW MIGHT CHRISTIAN LOVE SHAPE 
LAW? (Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Zachary R. Calo eds., 2017). 
12 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Christian Love and Criminal Punishment, in AGAPE, 
JUSTICE, AND LAW: HOW MIGHT CHRISTIAN LOVE SHAPE LAW?, supra note 11, at 151, 
151–52. William Temple was Archbishop from 1942 to 1944. 
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approach is fully consonant with the Catholic intellectual tradition, 
and another might qualify that conclusion.13  Reaching different 
conclusions does not mean that the Catholic intellectual tradition 
is being misapplied.  Instead, it is a recognition that more than 
one approach can emerge from the complexity and depth of the 
tradition.  As the authors would have to admit, the tradition 
contains the work of titans who are in tension with one another.  
Augustinians and Thomists might disagree on the law’s aim: the 
authors call that a pitfall,14 but I’d rather call it an opportunity—
an opportunity to teach students and the readers of our work the 
ways in which some of our disagreements come from distinct 
emphases within the same tradition.  Scholars and teachers will 
not find a blueprint, but they will find significant guideposts for 
doing the hard work of defining and promoting the common good 
in real times and places. 
Chapter Five of A Light Unseen does provide some examples 
of the kinds of intellectual work that would fall outside the 
tradition’s bounds: of course it would be inconsistent with the 
tradition to say the institution of private property or of 
government must be eliminated (since the tradition holds both 
as positives) or that a criminal had nothing to do with the 
commission of his crime (since the anthropology claims human 
agency).  Yet a scholar could still critique these positions from 
within the tradition—private property is always subject to the 
social mortgage; government is accountable to the populations it 
serves and should follow the principle of subsidiarity; and control 
over one’s actions can be diminished under certain circumstances, 
resulting in less severe punishment on the grounds of human 
dignity.  More examples would be helpful, to provide readers with 
a greater sense of possibilities.  Moreover, it should be expected 
that Catholic scholarship would not be insular.  We should 
 
13 Compare, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in 
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 208, 222–23 (“a realistic social order 
therefore must be designed around principles that fall short of Christian 
ideals. . . . Christian visions of justice therefore cannot determine the rules of 
economic order. Instead, legal rules and predictions about human behavior must 
assume the fallen state of Man, which is precisely what I have tried to suggest 
Economic Man permits us to do.”), with George E. Garvey, A Catholic Social 
Teaching Critique of Law and Economics, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, 
at 224, 224 (noting where Catholic Social Teaching is compatible with law and 
economics and where it is not). 
14 Breen & Strang, supra note 1, at 513.  
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welcome discourse with any scholars who engage the tradition,15 
as well as those with uncommon applications of the intellectual 
tradition.16  Likewise, we should welcome engagement with 
scholars who explicitly reject elements in the tradition.  
The authors have set the benchmark for faculty work as 
“consistency with Catholic, doctrinal, theological, and philosophical 
commitments.”17  Academic freedom would extend to “areas of 
reasonable debate and discussion about the Catholic intellectual 
tradition and its implications.”18  Catholic law schools would be 
free, however, not to extend academic freedom to  scholarship 
that is inconsistent with “central and mandatory facets of the 
tradition.”19  That sweeping prescription raises several questions: 
just what are those facets?  And does this imply that the 
Catholic intellectual tradition is coextensive with Church 
doctrine?20  
A law school is not the Church, just as a university is not the 
Church.  They are of course related, but distinct.  The reader 
should know more about the meaning of the required consistency.  
Navigating the line between the Church and law school has been 
a challenge from the beginning of Catholic legal education—and 
A Light Unseen gives us a fascinating look at that history.  Law 
faculty scholarship does not need a theologian’s nihil obstat or a 
bishop’s imprimatur, as theological writings might, nor should it.  
  
 
15 Richard O. Brooks, A New Agenda for Modern Environmental Law, 6 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 13 (1991). Professor Brooks, a scholar of Aristotle and Aquinas 
who founded the Environmental Law program at Vermont Law School, applies 
classical insights to environmental law, arguing that “natural law philosophy” must 
be at the foundation of a system of environmental laws. Id. 
16 Craig A. Ford, Jr., A Natural Law for Queer and Racial Justice, CANOPY 
FORUM (Jan. 21, 2020), https://canopyforum.org/2020/01/21/a-natural-law-for-queer-
and-racial-justice-by-craig-ford/ (continuing discussion in a series on the relationship 
between Natural Law and Human Rights in light of the State Department’s recently 
convened Commission on Unalienable Rights) [https://perma.cc/X6L2-FSHN].  
17 Breen & Strang, supra note 1, at 499. 
18 Id. at 529. 
19 Id. 
20 On the distinction between Catholic doctrine and the Catholic intellectual 
tradition, see generally FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN, CREATIVE FIDELITY: WEIGHING AND 
INTERPRETING DOCUMENTS OF THE MAGISTERIUM 52 (2003); FRANCIS A. 
SULLIVAN, MAGISTERIUM: TEACHING AUTHORITY IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (2002), 
and Richard M. Liddy, The Catholic Intellectual Tradition, CONVERSATIONS ON 
JESUIT HIGHER EDUC., Fall 2009, at 2, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/ 
56172221e4b0d3605b642f70/t/5680b21ab204d52319b5c2dc/1451274778480/Conv36.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3LT5-F8A5].  
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An important follow-up question to whether Church doctrine 
governs the Catholic law school is this: If the answer is yes, then 
what are the impacts of such a criterion?  How might a requirement 
of doctrinal consistency impact teaching and scholarship?  Who 
makes the decision whether a piece of scholarship is inconsistent: 
Deans?  Faculty peers?  Priests at the university?  A committee?  
Would this have a chilling effect on scholarship?21  How might 
this system work without discouraging Catholic scholars from 
becoming part of a more intentional Catholic community?   
It is no secret that the Church itself is internally divided in 
many ways, including (but not limited to) integralists offering a 
critique of political liberalism, those who would remake Church 
teaching into the platform of the Republican or Democratic party, 
and those who don’t even accept the legitimacy of Pope Francis.  
There are those who seek to minimize the reforms of the Second 
Vatican Council, those in the extreme who deny its legitimacy, 
and those who seek to highlight the Council’s value and 
validity.22  I worry that the book’s most significant contribution—
the proposal of integrating the Catholic intellectual tradition into 
the law school curriculum—could be overshadowed by concerns 
about orthodoxy and its enforcement, about who’s in and who’s 
out.  Most unfortunately, the specter of censorship (overt or 
subtle) could shut down various avenues of scholarly exploration 
that are fully consonant with the intellectual tradition.  Even 
accepting the premise regarding consistency with the Catholic 
intellectual tradition, it is fair to expect some discussion 
concerning the “administrability” of this approach and its 
potential negative side effects. 
 
21 For instance, as the authors note, the Catholic tradition “has not definitively 
identified one particular conception of the common good,” so there can be multiple 
perspectives. Breen & Strang, supra note 1, at 518. But a law school culture with a 
particularly strict view of church doctrine might have the effect of discouraging 
faculty from even exploring those perspectives. 
22 For commentators with a more optimistic view, see, for example, ALBERIC 
STACPOOLE, VATICAN II: BY THOSE WHO WERE THERE (1986); THE HISTORY OF 
VATICAN II (Giuseppe Alberigo & Joseph A. Komonchak eds., Matthew J. O’Connell 
trans., 2006) (five volumes); JOHN W. O’MALLEY, WHAT HAPPENED AT VATICAN II 
(2008); MASSIMO FAGGIOLI, TRUE REFORM: LITURGY AND ECCLESIOLOGY IN 
SACROSANCTUM CONCILIUM (2012); RICHARD R. GAILLARDETZ, AN UNFINISHED 
COUNCIL: VATICAN II, POPE FRANCIS, AND THE RENEWAL OF CATHOLICISM, at ix–x 
(2015); MASSIMO FAGGIOLI, POPE FRANCIS: TRADITION IN TRANSITION (2015).  
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B. The Catholic Intellectual Tradition on the Limits of Law 
In response to the previous concern, I would urge the 
authors to focus on the generous scope of the tradition, with a 
strong recommendation that they include a description of 
Aquinas’s distinction between morality and law.  That notion is 
critical to mediating between and among the Catholic intellectual 
tradition, Church doctrine, and the faculty’s role in the law 
school classroom and in scholarship.  John Courtney Murray, 
S.J., was the great expositor of this distinction in the American 
context.  Gregory Kalscheur, S.J., has described Murray’s thought 
as follows:  “Morality (which governs all of human conduct) and 
law (which governs the public order of society) are not 
coextensive in their functions.  Legal prohibitions can have only 
limited effect on shaping moral character.”23  A law that attempts 
to promote moral standards will thwart its own goals, in Fr. 
Murray’s words, “by bringing itself into contempt.”24  
Some of the concerns over orthodoxy resolve themselves when 
considering the limits of law.  Following Aquinas, Fr. Murray said 
that “human law must be framed with a view to the level of 
virtue that is actually possible to expect from the people required  
to comply with the law.”25  He suggested evaluating whether a 
law is prudent by posing a series of questions:  
Will the prohibition be obeyed, at least by most people?  Is it 
enforceable against the disobedient?  Is it prudent to enforce 
this ban, given the possibility of harmful effects in other areas 
of social life?  Is the instrumentality of a coercive law a good 
means for the eradication of the targeted social evil?  And since 
law that usually fails is not a good means, what are the lessons 
of experience with this sort of legal prohibition?  If legislation is 
to be properly crafted—from a moral point of view and with the 
goal of promoting the common good of society, “these are the 
questions that jurisprudence must answer.” 26   
 
23 Gregory A. Kalscheur, American Catholics and the State, AMERICA (Aug. 2, 2004), 
https://www.americamagazine.org/issue/492/article/american-catholics-and-state 
[https://perma.cc/W7CU-YWLL]. These concerns are echoed in our present day. See, 
e.g., Robert McElroy, Bishop McElroy on Voting with Faith and a Conscience, NAT’L 
CATH. REP. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.ncronline.org/news/opinion/bishop-mcelroy-
voting-faith-and-conscience (describing why it is inappropriate to use intrinsic evil 
as the determiner of public policy positions) [https://perma.cc/QZJ3-XNHS]. 
24 Kalscheur, supra note 23.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
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Fr. Murray further points to a modest prerequisite “level of 
consensus as to the goodness of the law.”27  Without this consensus, 
changes in law “will be unenforceable, ineffective, and resented 
as unduly restrictive of freedom.”28 
Given this distinction, the role of the faculty member at a 
Catholic law school will necessarily entail addressing the efficacy 
of laws that prohibit or discourage what the tradition considers 
immoral conduct.  This would include the exploration of empirical 
work regarding the impacts of laws in order to answer the 
questions Fr. Murray poses.  If law is ineffective, then “[i]f society 
wishes to elevate and maintain moral standards above the 
minimal level required for the healthy functioning of the social 
order, it must look to institutions other than the law.”29  Thus, 
faculty should tackle head-on these and other issues regarding 
the ways in which laws shape or discourage moral behavior.  And 
faculty need not avoid expanding the discussion to extra-legal 
solutions.  Indeed, these extra-legal solutions likely involve law 
as well, not as prohibitions but as vehicles for facilitating moral 
alternatives.  
Take abortion as an example.  I think it is fair to assume 
that even if abortion were completely criminalized everywhere in 
the nation, that would not be the end of abortion.  If ending 
abortion is the goal, then the discussion must turn to ways in 
which a culture of life is built.  This would involve a discussion of 
law, particularly affirmative laws that help create social and 
economic conditions which encourage family life.30  It would also 
involve a discussion of new and existing private institutions that 
can provide help (broadly defined) to pregnant women, and the 
ways in which law facilitates their creation and coordination.  
Establishing housing or health care facilities, or the provision of 
financial assistance to pregnant women, raises many legal topics 
for an entity engaged in this mission: the freedom to incorporate, 
to locate, to advertise, and to seek funding; the types of  
 
 
 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. (emphasis added). 
30 Of course, Aquinas and Fr. Murray were only concerned about prohibitions. 
American law is so much more than bans on conduct. There are other ways that 
laws contribute affirmatively to creating social conditions that are pro-life, including 
health care, reductions in poverty, broadening the middle class, education, etc.  
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regulation that will apply to its establishment; and the like.  This 
is a way to discuss a pro-life position that is practical and 
unafraid of exploration.  
C. The Catholic Intellectual Tradition and Its Contribution to 
American and International Law 
Students at Catholic law schools should know the history of 
Catholic contributions to the development of institutions that 
shaped and continue to shape American law.  In addition to 
natural law, the involvement of clergy in the development of the 
common law and the law of equity offer a prime example.31  Mary 
Ann Glendon describes the unmistakable influence of Catholic 
thought on international human rights in the post-war period.32  
This is not an attempt to overstate the influence, but rather to 
properly credit Catholic contributions to current legal institutions, 
processes, and doctrines.33  As law and religion scholar Harold 
Berman poignantly asked, “Can we not say that God has revealed 
Himself in existing legal institutions, and that he continues to 
reveal Himself in the development of those institutions, insofar as 
they reflect justice and mercy and good faith?”34 
III. IDENTIFYING AN ADDITIONAL STRENGTH: 
A REVOLUTION IN LEGAL ETHICS  
When we graduate students, we send them out into the 
profession much like we are sent at the end of Mass: to love and 
to serve the world.  We send them out to do justice and serve 
 
31 John T. Noonan, Jr., A Catholic Law School, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037, 
1038–39 (1992). 
32 Mary Ann Glendon, Catholic Influences on the Human Rights Project, BOS. C. 
C21 RESOURCES, Spring 2007, at 19, https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/top/ 
church21/pdf/Spring_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P36-GQU3]. 
33 There is obviously some linkage to the Catholic scholars of the 1930s and 
1940s described in Chapter Two. See Breen & Strang, supra note 1, at 180–86 
(detailing a conspicuous lack of historical accounts of the prominent role played by 
Catholic legal scholars in the jurisprudential debates of the 1920s, 1930s, and 
1940s); id. at 197–208 (describing the contributions of prominent Catholic legal 
scholars to the debate over Legal Realism). 
34 Harold J. Berman, Foreword to CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 
xiii. Professor Berman has written extensively on the history of Catholic and 
Protestant influences on law. See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND 
REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983); HAROLD 
J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT 
REFORMATION ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (2003); HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE 
INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974); HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: 
THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1993).  
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the common good.  That means we are obligated to equip them 
for what they will encounter.  We do that in many ways as we 
provide doctrinal courses, skills development and experiential 
learning, internships, and the like.  It is no surprise that 
professional ethics would be a focus of Catholic legal education.  
A Light Unseen provides a solid view of character formation and 
virtue ethics that should animate our curriculum in this area: 
theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom, justice, temperance, and 
fortitude.35  Our graduates move into public and private 
entities—media, finance, politics, education, government, and the 
nonprofit sector.  We hope they will be upstanding persons of 
great character whose view of ethics goes beyond the rules of 
professional conduct.   
But personal virtue might not be enough for true ethical 
action in certain situations when an accurate reading of one’s 
context and one’s role within it has become distorted.  Deborah 
Rhode, a professor at Stanford and ethics scholar, focused on the 
lawyers involved in the 2003 Enron scandal—in-house, outside 
counsel, and counsel for the accounting firm—at a time when 
most attention was on the failures of accountants, managers, and 
boards of directors.  Lawyers indeed contributed to the Enron 
collapse, given all of the “structural incentives” that affected 
their actions.36  What happened?  Professor Rhode explains, “When 
 
35 Breen & Strang, supra note 1, at 536. “A just lawyer is one who exercises 
judgment ‘according to the written law.’ ” Id. at 538 (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 
SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II-II, Q. 60, art. 5 (Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province trans., Benziger Bros. ed., 1947)). A temperate lawyer will resist a bribe; a 
courageous lawyer “will advocate according to the law” even at the risk of 
professional harm. Id. 
36 Deborah L. Rhode, If Integrity Is the Answer, What Is the Question? 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 333, 343–44 (2003). To quote Professor Rhode: 
Subsequent studies similarly demonstrate how market forces and 
organizational pressures can undermine moral judgment and professional 
responsibilities. When faced with a misalignment of ethical principles, peer 
pressures, and workplace incentives, many individuals unconsciously 
readjust their principles or develop strategies of moral disengagement that 
enable them to rationalize misconduct. In these circumstances, people often 
have a poor grasp of their own reasoning processes. Strategies such as 
euphemistic labelling, displacement or diffusion of responsibility, and 
reattribution of blame often permit lawyers and corporate managers to 
deny accountability for unethical actions. Such strategies are apparent not 
only in the massive moral meltdowns that have recently been on display, 
but also in everyday deceptions of seemingly petty proportion. Over time, 
such dissembling breeds a climate that corrupts judgment and lays the 
foundations for more serious misconduct. Fudging on hourly billing reports, 
willful blindness to client and collegial fraud, or strategic withholding of 
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faced with a misalignment of ethical principles, peer pressures, 
and workplace incentives, many individuals unconsciously readjust 
their principles or develop strategies of moral disengagement 
that enable them to rationalize misconduct.”37  In particular,  
lawyers’ professional norms of client loyalty often conflict with 
personal norms of honesty and integrity.  To reduce the cognitive 
dissonance, lawyers will often unconsciously dismiss or discount 
evidence of misconduct and its impact on third parties.  The 
risks of such dissonance are exacerbated when lawyers bond 
socially and professionally with the client’s management team.  
The more that counsel blends into the culture of corporate 
insiders, the greater the pressures of cohesiveness.38 
In these “everyday deceptions of seemingly petty proportion”39 
lawyers can easily come to be in denial regarding their role in a 
corrupt system. 
 
material facts are all predictable responses to the institutional incentive 
structures prevailing in many workplaces. “Virtue,” Mark Twain once 
observed, “never has been as respectable as money.” And where short-term 
profits and personal salaries are the key determinants of power and status, 
integrity will often lag behind. 
We obviously cannot solve those problems in business and professional 
schools. But we can devote more of our teaching and scholarship to 
institutional reforms that will make virtue more than its own reward. For 
example, greater attention should focus on strategies for creating ethical 
infrastructures and compliance programs in corporate and legal 
organizations. Such frameworks require clear standards of responsibilities 
and protections concerning internal whistle blowing, along with adequate 
ethical policies, training, reporting channels, enforcement, and reward 
structures. 
Id. (quoting MARK TWAIN, THE INNOCENTS ABROAD 590 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) 
(1896)). 
37 Id. at 343. 
38 Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 9, 32 (2002) (footnote omitted). Professor Rhode characterized Enron in 
this way:  
American lawyers’ tendency to privilege client interests over other 
values is not, of course, readily challenged. The current norm is rooted not 
only in practitioners’ bottom-line concerns, as Vinson & Elkins’ conduct 
amply demonstrates, but also in cognitive psychological processes. . . . That, 
in turn, encourages lawyers to underestimate risk and to suppress 
compromising information in order to preserve internal solidarity. Yet, in 
the long run, this dynamic ill serves all concerned. Clients lose access to 
disinterested advice about their own liability; lawyers lose capacity for 
independent judgment and moral autonomy; and the public loses protection 
from organizational misconduct. Enron is a case history of all those costs. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
39 Rhode, supra note 36, at 343. 
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Since that time, there has been a realization that character 
and virtue alone do not equip individuals to navigate ethically in 
certain circumstances.  The explosion in compliance programs 
and the intentional creation of ethical corporate contexts have 
resulted from the realization that structural responses are 
necessary to create the right environments and the right  
incentives.  Indeed, Seton Hall Law School has been a leader in 
the compliance area.  Professors teaching courses in professional 
ethics have also responded.40 
I have wondered about the many lawyers who represented 
church entities when information about clergy sex abuse of 
children began to emerge.  Were they lacking in virtues, as that 
term is described in the book?  Did they lack courage to 
aggressively urge bishops to recognize the crisis and put 
preventive measures in place?  Or were they enmeshed in a 
system, like Professor Rhode describes, in which they so 
identified with their client and the culture of clericalism, with its 
secrecy and protect-the-institution mentality, that they couldn’t 
perceive a bigger role for themselves as counselors, as creative 
problem solvers, or as seekers of justice?41  Did any lawyer have 
the courage, the wisdom, and the distance to remind the bishop 
that he leads the Roman Catholic Church, which proclaims itself 
to be the sign and safeguard of the transcendence of the human 
person?  And that the victimization of children is completely at 
odds with this proclamation?   
 
40 Rhode & Paton, supra note 38, at 36. 
Yet while the contributions of professional responsibility education should 
not be overstated, neither should they be undervalued. Most research 
indicates that strategies for dealing with ethical issues change significantly 
during early adulthood, and that well-designed curricular coverage can 
improve capacities for moral reasoning. Such coverage can increase 
students’ understanding of ethical dilemmas, as well as the analytic 
approaches and regulatory responses that can assist in solutions. Rather 
than abstract sermonizing on “right and wrong,” ethics curricula can focus 
on concrete cases, as well as on professional codes, organizational policies, 
and doctrinal, statutory, and administrative requirements. So, too, 
well-designed courses can explore the structural conditions underlying 
moral dilemma and the most promising regulatory responses. 
Id. 
41 JOHN JAY COLL. RSCH. TEAM, THE CAUSES AND CONTEXT OF SEXUAL 
ABUSE OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1950-2010, at 84–
85 (2011), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/child-and-youth-protection/upload/ 
The-Causes-and-Context-of-Sexual-Abuse-of-Minors-by-Catholic-Priests-in-the-United-
States-1950-2010.pdf (describing limits to institutional innovation when churches 
become overly concerned about institutional reputation and stability) 
[https://perma.cc/DC6N-BR8P].  
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Surely there were such courageous lawyers.  We can certainly 
imagine how they began to recognize the crisis as early as the 
1980s.  We see their fingerprints when we consider some of the 
efforts of the early 1990s, like the establishment of principles by 
the national bishops’ conference and preventive protocols in some 
dioceses.  Even though efforts like these were scattered and 
ineffective, they nonetheless came a full decade before The Boston 
Globe exposé broke.  Only after this did the bishops’ conference 
make a concerted effort to take action.42  Looking back, then, we 
can see that some lawyers understood their “bigger role.”  But 
most did not, likely for the reasons Professor Rhode sets out.  
After dozens of trials, more than twenty diocesan bankruptcies, 
and newly reopened statutes of limitation, the Church has paid 
out nearly four billion dollars to victims.43  State governments are 
now the heroes, cast as protectors of Catholic parishioners from a 
harmful Church hierarchy.  
The Catholic law school’s professional ethics program must 
consider the successes and failures of lawyers involved in these 
types of situations.  Placing the study of virtue ethics within 
these challenging scenarios will give students a robust 
demonstration of the traditional virtues.  Indeed, helping 
students develop a critical, prophetic voice in service of their 
clients could be an enormous contribution of the Catholic law 
school, by contextualizing virtues like prudence and courage in 
real-life situations and by expanding the traditional virtues to 
encompass love, compassion, empathy, and solidarity. 
 
42 The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops adopted its Charter for the 
Protection of Children and Young People (2002) and related protocols. See Charter 
for the Protection of Children and Young People, UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF 
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/child-and-youth-protection/ 
charter.cfm (last visited June 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YM9J-96HQ]. 
43 Bernard Condon & Jim Mustian, Surge of New Abuse Claims Threatens 
Church Like Never Before, AP NEWS (Dec. 1, 2019), https://apnews.com/ 
621efb9528384f278c71a97308404531 [https://perma.cc/XH42-DVYM]; Bankruptcy 
Protection in the Abuse Crisis, BISHOPACCOUNTABILITY.ORG, http://www.bishop-
accountability.org/bankruptcy.htm (last visited June 29, 2020) (listing all diocesan 
bankruptcies) [https://perma.cc/3M3X-T536]. 
